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THE PARTISAN BATTLE OVER THE
CONSTITUTION: MEESE'S
JURISPRUDENCE OF ORIGINAL
INTENTION AND BRENNAN'S
THEORY OF CONTEMPORARY
RATIFICATION
JONATHAN

I.

K. VAN PATTEN*

INTRODUCTION

There is a cartoon from the New Yorker where the family
is sitting in the lawyer's office listening to the reading of a will.
Imagine the surprised look on their faces when the lawyer
says: "My goodness! Your dear old uncle seems to have left
everything to me."' We can also imagine that even though
the lawyer himself has expressed surprise at this result, he
must have known all along that this was the natural consequence of the way in which the estate plan was drafted.
In a similar fashion, lawyers involved in litigation sometimes resort to what has come to be known as "law office history." The end sought in litigation, of course, is a favorable
result and sometimes the result can be achieved by the claiming of a "legacy" from the appropriate authorities, particularly when those authorities are the Framers of the
Constitution, the Bill of Rights, or the fourteenth amendment.
The lawyer's search for historical authority can become quite
selective, with contravening practices and principles being ignored or distorted. Thus, "law office history" has more to do
with advocacy than with scholarship, although its effective* Professor of Law, University of South Dakota School of Law: B.A., 1970, University of California at Los Angeles; J.D., 1973, University of California at Los Angeles
School of Law. An earlier version of this article was presented at the 1986 Meeting of
the Canadian Association for American Studies in Montreal, Canada, at McGill University. I wish to thank Dr. Peter Schotten, Dr. Frederick Vaughan, Dr. Paul Van
Patten, Jr., and Kelly Smidt, USD Class of '87, for their reading of the manuscript and
their advice.
1. The cartoon, by Peter Arno, is reprinted in J. DUKEMINIER & S. JOHANSON,
FAMILY WEALTH TRANSACTIONS 260 (2d ed. 1978).
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ness for advocacy purposes is enhanced by the ability of the
lawyer to make it look like scholarship.
The recent exchange between Attorney General Edwin
Meese and Supreme Court Justice William Brennan on the
role of original intent in constitutional interpretation shows
this tendency to favor one's own political position with an ostensibly objective appeal to historical authorities. Attorney
General Meese advocated in a series of speeches a "jurisprudence of original intention," which he argued would restore
the Supreme Court to its proper role in American government. Meese suggested very strongly that the failure of the
current Supreme Court to give proper respect to the text of
the Constitution and the intentions of its Framers had caused
the Court to enter the realm of policy-making, a realm traditionally reserved for the legislative and executive branches.
In a speech at Georgetown University, Justice Brennan responded to Meese by denying that the historical record could
supply direct answers to the myriad of issues arising in modem constitutional cases. He argued that the Court in the
twentieth century had to adapt the "great principles [of the
Constitution] to cope with current problems and current
needs." 2 He also suggested that the ambiguity of the text and
the consequent flexibility was as the Framers had intended.3
The debate between Meese and Brennan over constitutional interpretation has the tone and substance of a partisan
political debate. It is more concerned with politics than with
law. Meese argues for "original intent" when it is in his political interest to do so and ignores considerations of original
intent or historical precedents when they conflict with his immediate political goals. Brennan likewise relies on "original
intent" with respect to civil liberties, but generally eschews its
importance in other areas where the results would be incompatible with his position. Meese's and Brennan's readings of
the Constitution and the historical record are therefore essentially utilitarian. The Constitution and the historical record

2. Address by Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United
States: ContemporaryRatification, Georgetown University (Oct. 12, 1985) reprintedin
19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2, 7 (1985) [hereinafter Georgetown Speech].
3. Id. at 6-7.
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have meaning only insofar as they can be marshalled to support a predetermined political end.
Both Attorney General Meese and Justice Brennan have
claimed a legacy from the Framers in support of their own
respective positions. However, this legacy is not such that it
can be shared by both. In fact, neither Meese nor Brennan is
entitled to claim the legacy of the Framers. The "estate" must
be reserved for a more discerning beneficiary.

II.

ATTORNEY GENERAL MEESE'S JURISPRUDENCE OF
ORIGINAL INTENTION

Attorney General Meese's argument for a jurisprudence of
original intention may be found principally in three public
speeches given in the summer and fall of 1985. The first
speech was delivered at the annual meeting of the American
Bar Association in Washington, D.C. 4 This speech critically
reviewed some of the latest decisions from the Supreme Court
and suggested that the problems with those decisions derived
from the Court's departure from the language of the text and
the original intentions of the Framers. It was in this speech
that Meese proposed the restoration of a jurisprudence of
original intention.' In the same speech, he created an uproar
with his suggestion that the doctrine of incorporation, as contained in the Bill of Rights and applied to the states, was posit rested upon an "intellectually
sibly illegitimate because
6
shaky foundation."

The Washington Speech was followed by another address
to the American Bar Association, but this time the forum was
in London, England.7 Here, Meese briefly described the broad
principles underlying the Constitution and attempted to relate
these principles to his view of constitutional interpretation.
He cited Alexander Hamilton's argument in the FederalistPapers that the judiciary would have only limited powers under
4. Address by Attorney General Edwin Meese, The Supreme Court of the United
States: Bulwark of a Limited Constitution, Washington, D.C. (July 9, 1985) reprintedin
27 S.TEX. L. REV. 455 (1986) [hereinafter Washington Speech].
5. Id. at 464.
6. Id. at 463.
7. Address by Attorney General Edwin Meese, Address of The Honorable Edwin
Meese III Attorney Generalof the United States Before the American Bar Association,
Department of Justice, London, England (July 17, 1985) [hereinafter London Speech].
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the new Constitution. He then leveled criticism at those who
advocated "non-interpretive review," which he claimed
turned the judges into policymakers. Meese disputed the argument that the original understanding no longer had any direct relevance to the resolution of constitutional issues today
and asserted that these principles were no less applicable in
our times, no matter how unique we believe our times to be.
The third speech was given several months later, after Justice Brennan had spoken at Georgetown University, and it is
clearly the best of the three speeches." Meese responded to
Brennan's remarks and clarified his own position in several
important respects. He stated the case for reliance on the text
with greater care and attempted to indicate how the text
should be read in light of general principles underlying the
written Constitution. He reiterated his criticism of judicial activism because of its apparent departure from the text and its
underlying principles favoring a more modern "vision" or personal "concept of human dignity."
Because the three speeches all cover much of the same
ground, this article will not analyze them one after another.
Instead, it will attempt to synthesize Meese's views on the
adoption of the Constitution, the principles established
through its adoption, and describe how his views would shape
the adjudication of contemporary constitutional issues.
A.

The Framingof the Constitution.

The Constitution of the United States, according to Meese,
was fashioned on the basis of "centuries of experience" and
this was one of the reasons for its enduring nature. In the
London Speech, he acknowledged the influence of England on
American constitutionalism, and especially the influence of
Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. "From English philosophers came the theory of natural rights; from English jurists
came the theory of legal rights." 9 The rights articulated in the
Declaration of Independence are simply a "variation of the
8. Address by Attorney General Edwin Meese, Address to the D.C Chapterof the
FederalistSociety Lawyers Division, Washington, D.C. (Nov. 15, 1985), reprinted in 19
U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 22 (1985) [hereinafter Federalist Society Speech].
9. London Speech, supra note 7, at 2 (emphasis in original).

1987]

PARTISAN BATTLE OVER THE CONSTITUTION

393

philosophic themes of English liberalism.""0 The purpose of
the Constitution was to secure these natural rights in civil society. The American contribution to this process was a written constitution. "A written constitution was to serve as an
external and tangible check on any arbitrary exercise of governmental power.""1
The fact of a written constitution was important in itself.
It represented the deliberative effort of the Framers at the
Philadelphia Convention to set forth fundamental governmental arrangements in a legal document, to "get it in writing" in
Walter Berns' words.12 In the earlier speeches, Meese also argued that the language of the written document reflected more
than anything else the original understanding of the Framers:
"Those who framed the Constitution chose their words carefully; they debated at great length the most minute points.
The language they chose meant something."1 3 While this
statement is correct as to the lengthy debates of the Convention, it is misleading. The delegates did argue at great length
on some very minute points, but not thoroughly on all points.
There are some important provisions in the Constitution
whose meaning cannot be ascertained from the debates alone
because they were not discussed with any specificity. The
commerce clause, a source of much litigation in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, made its first appearance
at the Convention in the report of the Committee on Detail
and was passed by the whole body without objection. 14 The
privileges and immunities clause likewise emerged from the
report of the Committee on Detail. There is no authoritative
account from the Convention records of the meaning of this
clause. 15
There was considerable debate in the Convention over the
nature of the executive branch of the new national govern10. Id. at 2.
11. Id. at 3 (emphasis in original).
12. Federalist Society Speech, supra note 8, at 24.
13. Washington Speech, supra note 4, at 465.
14. J. MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

389, 469 (A. Koch ed. 1966) [hereinafter MADISON]. See also 11 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 483-86 (P. Kurland & R. Lerner ed. 1987) [hereinafter II THE FOUNDERS'
CONSTITUTION].

15. MADISON, supra note 14, at 394, 545; II THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION,

supra note 14, at 488-89.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:389

ment. The debates and the textual language agreed upon in
Philadelphia, however, tell us little about the American presidency, even as it developed in the nineteenth century and certainly as it has expanded in the twentieth century. For
example, can the presidential role in foreign policy today be
traced in any meaningful sense to the intentions of the Framers? The shaping of legislative policy through the budgetmaking process and the growth of administrative agencies
under the control and supervision of the President and his
cabinet do not have their origins in the debates in Philadelphia. The growth of practices and precedents in the development of the presidency and related executive branch agencies
must be considered outside of Meese's definition of "original
intent."
Nor does the problem of ascertaining the original intent
become easier when one considers civil liberties issues. The
Bill of Rights provisions, with the exception of the religion16
clauses, were not extensively debated in the First Congress.
It would be very difficult to articulate the original intention
concerning several of the Bill of Rights provisions on the basis
of the few comments made in the debates. One must glean the
original intention, in part, from then existing practices and
contemporaneous documents because many of the Bill of
Rights provisions were evidently part of a shared understanding among the members of the First Congress as well as those
who ratified the Bill of Rights. While Meese is correct to
point out that "the Constitution is not buried in the mists of
time," 17 it is fair to say there are some important gaps and
uncertainties in the historical record.
Meese's earlier speeches also suggest that there was common agreement among the Framers on the matters considered
in the Constitution. By his repeated references to "the" intention of the Framers, he apparently assumes that it is intelligible to talk about "the" intention of a group. This is always a
risky assumption, but it is particularly tenuous with the Constitutional Convention. Anyone who reads Madison's Notes
16. See, eg., V THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, 128-29 (P. Kurland & R. Lerner

ed. 1987) (speech and press) [hereinafter V THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION]; Id. at 237
(search and seizure); Id. at 262-63 (criminal process); Id. at 377 (cruel and unusual
punishment).
17. Federalist Society Speech, supra note 8,at 23.
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on the Convention of 178718 will find deep divisions among the
delegates, divisions which are not completely repaired by the
successful conclusion of the Convention.
Meese softened his position somewhat regarding common
agreement among the Framers in his later speech to the Federalist Society:
This is not to suggest that there was unanimity among
the Framers and ratifiers on all points. The Constitution
and the Bill of Rights, and some of the subsequent amendments, emerged after protracted debate. Nobody got everything they wanted. What's more, the Framers were not
clairvoyants - they could not foresee every issue that would
be submitted for judicial review. Nor could they predict
how all forseeable disputes would be resolved under the
Constitution. But the point is, the meaning of the Constitution can be known. 9
Note that even here Meese is insisting on the existence of
"the" meaning of the Constitution. As Dr. Peter Schotten
points out, Meese himself unwittingly demonstrates the difficulty of understanding the Framers' meaning when he asserts
that the purpose of the Constitution was to secure limited government. ° If this were so, the delegates in Philadelphia
would not have proposed to replace the weak central government of the Articles of Confederation with a much stronger
national government. One could argue, as did Hamilton in
The FederalistNo. 70,21 that a strong government is necessary
for the protection of individual rights and therefore necessary
if there is to be limited government. But this makes the meaning of the Constitution considerably more complex than simply the size or scope of the national government. Because of
the correspondence of Meese's characterization of the Constitution's meaning with the Reagan Administration's own political agenda of limiting the operations of the national
government, one suspects that this characterization has an underlying partisan purpose.
18. MADISON, supra note 14.

19. Federalist Society Speech, supra note 8, at 24.
20. P. Schotten, The United States Constitution Interpreted and Debated: Changing Times, Unchanging Principles 7, Meeting of the Canadian Association for American Studies, Montreal, Canada (1986) (unpublished manuscript).

21.

THE FEDERALIST

No. 70, at 423 (A. Hamilton) (C.Rossiter ed. 1961).
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Meese also engaged in a fanciful account of the political
concerns over adoption of the new Constitution and thereby
greatly oversimplified, among other things, the Framers' attitudes toward the federal judiciary. After describing Hamilton's classic defense of judicial review under the Constitution,
Meese says there were skeptics at that time who claimed the
federal judiciary would abuse its power and interpret the Constitution according to the reasoning spirit of it, without regard
to the words or letter. This, of course, is exactly the charge
that Meese levels against the current Court. And what was
the response of the Framers to this argument?
In response to these concerns, the friends of the Constitution
made a promise. There would be no danger of government
by an unfettered judiciary. To avoid arbitrary discretion in
the courts, the Constitution provided that they would be
'bound down by strict rules'; the judicial tradition promised
they would22 be hedged in by the common law regard for
precedent.

The Constitution itself, of course, made no such promise or
provision. Hamilton made the statement in The Federalist
No. 78, in the course of trying to persuade the voters of New
York to ratify the new Constitution.23 Whether it was a
promise or an expectation, it is hard to say. If it was a promise, by what authority did Hamilton make such a promise?
Even more difficult to determine is how many shared Hamilton's view. There was little discussion of the powers and limitations of the federal judiciary in the debates at Philadelphia.24
One of the stronger points concerning the importance of
the written Constitution is its underpinning for the defense of
judicial review.25 Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Marbury
v. Madison 26 relied heavily on the notion of a written constitu22. London Speech, supra note 7, at 7.
23. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 471 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
24. See, e.g., Levy, JudicialReview, History, and Democracy: An Introduction, in
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE SUPREME COURT 1-11 (L. Levy ed. 1967).
25. Even Justice Brennan, to anticipate a little bit, has to acknowledge the impor-

tance of the written Constitution when he says: "It is the very purpose of a Constitution
- and particularly of the Bill of Rights - to declare certain values transcendent, beyond the reach of temporary political majorities." Brennan, supra note 2, at 6. In order
to meet the objection posed by the counter-majoritarian difficulty, Brennan must assert

that the Constitution does have its status ultimately in the will of the people and its
meaning from the words of the document.
26. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 368 (1803).
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tion as the basis for judicial power to strike down laws contrary to the fundamental will of the people. Whatever the
Framers intended with respect to judicial review, it is safe to
say -that they did not intend for the judiciary to disregard the
written words of the Constitution.
Whether the Framers considered the written Constitution
to be the sole basis for review of legislative acts cannot be conclusively determined from the debates in the Convention.
There are indications that some delegates believed that legislation contrary to principles of natural justice would be struck
down by the judiciary. For example, at one point in the Convention, they discussed a prohibition of ex post facto laws.27
Governor Morris thought such a provision was unnecessary.28
Oliver Elseworth contended that no one, lawyer or nonlawyer,
thought that ex post facto laws were valid.29 James Wilson
objected on the ground that such laws were clearly invalid and
inclusion of a written prohibition against them would only
cause embarassment. 30 Wilson argued that others would believe the Framers were ignorant of "first principles of legislation" if they put something in writing which was already
obvious to any educated lawyer or legislator .3a The delegates
agreed, nevertheless, to include the provision against ex post
facto laws, probably on account of the practical observation of
Hugh Williamson that a written provision would aid the
judges by giving them something to grasp.32 This example
shows the difficulty of reading the debates for a definitive answer as to the Framers' intentions on a specific issue. The
evidence here can be read both ways. The inclusion of what
was regarded as an obvious provision strengthens the case for
the text as the exclusive or, at least, primary basis of constitutional interpretation. On the other hand, those delegates who
believed there were unwritten principles of law and legislation
may have acceded to the inclusion of the ex post facto provision because they felt it ultimately would do no harm.

27. MADISON, supra note 14, at 510.
28. Id.
29. Id.

30. Id. at 511.
31. Id. at 510-11.
32. Id. at 5ll.
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Meese's emphasis on the importance of the written Constitution is intended to compel the judges to restrict the scope of
their constitutional inquiry. This emphasis, however, has the
unintended effect of making the Framers into legal positivists,
a characterization which cannot be sustained by a fair reading
of the records of the Convention. Meese himself correctly
noted the influence of the natural law tradition, particularly in
Thomas Jefferson's formulation in the Declaration of Independence. However, he asserted that the written constitution
is the sequel to this natural law tradition. 33 This does a disservice to both the Constitution and the natural law tradition
upon which it is based.34
There were several occasions during the Constitutional
Convention where the delegates argued on the basis of natural
law or principles of natural justice.3 5 After the convention,
much criticism was directed at the document produced because of a failure to include a Bill of Rights. In response,
Hamilton argued that the protection of rights was implicit in
the structure of the document. The people had retained their
rights because the new government was a government of limited powers.36
Here ... the people surrender nothing; and as they retain
everything they have no need of particular reservations, 'We,
the People of the United States, to secure the blessings of
liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.'
Here is a better recognition of popular rights than volumes
of those aphorisms which make the principal figure in several of our State bills of rights and which would sound much
better in a treatise of ethics than in a constitution of
government.37
Hamilton is clearly arguing that the written Constitution
is not the exclusive basis of the people's rights. This is consistent with the contemporaneous understanding. Consider, for

33. London Speech, supra note 7, at 3.
34. See Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional Law,
42 HARV. L. REV. 149 (1928).
35. MADISON, supra note 14, at 220-21, 411, 510-11.
36. THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 513 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).

37. Id.
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example, the ninth amendment.38 It clearly indicates the
Framers' desire not to exclude rights by the fact of their omission from the Bill of Rights. The ninth amendment rejects the
common law maxim of "what is not included is therefore excluded." If we are to give great weight to the Framers' written expressions, the ninth amendment provides strong
evidence that the Framers themselves did not intend the written document to be an exhaustive statement of individual
rights. Meese's ostensible reliance upon the Framers' intent,
without taking into account the plain words of the ninth
amendment, thus appears to be selective.
There is some dispute whether the Framers themselves intended that judges be governed by the original intention.39
Meese cites the following statement from James Madison:
I entirely concur in the propriety of resorting to the sense in
which the Constitution was accepted and ratified by the nation. In that sense alone it is the legitimate Constitution.
And if that be not the guide in expounding it, there can be
no security for a consistent and stable, more than for a faithful, exercise of its powers."
Madison's position on the use of evidence of original intention, however, is more complex. He also stated in private correspondence: "As a guide in expounding and applying the
provisions of the Constitution, the debates and incidental decisions of the Convention can have no authoritative character."41 In Madison's view, constitutional interpretation
should rely on the text and the intentions of the state ratifiers,
not those who sat in Philadelphia. 42 This, of course, makes
the task of ascertaining the intention of the Framers even
more difficult.
38. U.S. CONST. amend. IX: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."
39. See, e.g., Powell, The Original Understandingof Original Intent, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 885 (1985).

40. London Speech, supra note 7, at 12; Federalist Society Speech, supra note 8, at
26.
41. POWELL, supra note 39, at 936 (quoting letter from James Madison to Thomas
Richie (Sept. 15, 1821), reprinted in 3 LETTERS AND OTHER WRmNGS OF JAMES

MADISON 228 (1865)). See also Rakove, Mr. Meese, Meet Mr. Madison, The ATLANTIC
MONTHLY 79 (Dec. 1986).
42. Powell, supra note 39, at 935-41.
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Thus far, a number of problems with Meese's account of
the framing of the Constitution have arisen. There are more
gaps, ambiguities, and uncertainties in the historical record
than Meese is willing to admit. This makes the task of ascertaining the intent of the Framers more difficult. Also, it is not
clear who the "Framers" are - whose intent should be consulted. It is clear that the intent of the Framers, with respect
to the New Constitution, was more diversified than a single
concern for limited government. Moreover, to the extent that
Meese's emphasis on the written Constitution promotes the
text as the exclusive basis of rights, his position comes into
conflict with his statement that the purpose of the Constitution was to form a limited government. Meese's account of
the framing of the Constitution remains unsatisfactory until
these conflicts can be reconciled.
B. Specific Rules, Express Principles,and
General Principles.
Meese's account of the framing of the Constitution is intended to establish the process by which the Constitution is to
be interpreted. The next step, therefore, is to look at Meese's
description of this process.
If the Constitution is to be read in light of the Framers'
intentions, what does it contain? It contains some rules that
are as exactingly specific: 43 the age qualifications for certain
offices, the organization of the House and the Senate, and the
procedure for impeachment of federal officials.
But the Constitution is not simply a municipal code. It
contains certain express principles, according to Meese: "One
is the right to be free of an unreasonable search or seizure.
Another concerns religious liberty. Another is the right to
equal protection of the laws. Those who framed these principles meant something by them. And the meanings can be
found, understood, and applied."' Meese is silent here on
what the Framers intended with respect to these express principles, but he provides examples elsewhere; these will be discussed in the next section.
43. Federalist Society Speech, supra note 8, at 24.
44. Id. at 25.
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In addition to the principles expressly set forth in the text,
there are general principles which underlie the Constitution.
Meese's earlier attempts at stating the purpose of the Constitution were awkward and too limited,4 5 but his Federalist Society Speech contained the following formulation:
The Constitution itself is also an expression of certain general principles. These principles reflect the deepest purpose
of the Constitution - that of establishing a political system
through which Americans can best govern themselves consistent with the goal of securing liberty.
The text and structure of the Constitution are instructive. It contains very little in the way of specific political
solutions. It speaks volumes on how problems should be approached, and by whom. 46
This formulation suggests that additional principles may be
found underlying the text and implicit in the structure of the
Constitution. According to Meese, the text and structure
"speak volumes" on how to approach constitutional issues,
and who should be making the decisions.
One underlying premise of the Constitution is that "democratic self-government is subject only to the limits of certain
constitutional principles."'4 Here, Meese emphasizes that the
chief policy-making role is given to the Congress, not the
courts. He cites McCulloch v. Maryland48 as support for the
broad powers given to Congress to deal with the "various crises of human affairs." He further suggests that some have
wrongly attributed to McCulloch the freedom of the Court to
elaborate and expand constitutional principles. 49 The principle of democratic self-government is intended by Meese to create a presumption in favor of legislation, unless there is a clear
and express provision of the Constitution to the contrary.50
One difficulty with implied general principles lies in the
fact that they are, to a certain extent, in conflict with the notion of a written constitution. Where there is an apparent ten45. Washington Speech, supra note 4, at 457; London Speech, supra note 7, at 3.
46. Federalist Society Speech, supra note 8, at 25 (emphasis in original).
47. Id. at 25.
48.

17 U.S. 415 (1819).

49. Federalist Society Speech, supra note 8, at 25.
50. The power to declare acts of Congress and laws of the states null and void is
truly awesome. This power must be used when the Constitution clearly speaks. It
should not be used when the Constitution does not. Id. at 29.
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sion between the principle and the text, further inquiry is
required to avoid interpreting the Constitution according to
its "spirit" rather than its express words. Meese makes this
point in his Federalist Society Speech:
Where the language of the Constitution is specific, it must be
obeyed. Where there is a demonstrable consensus among
the Framers and ratifiers as to a principle stated or implied
by the Constitution, it should be followed. Where there is
ambiguity as to the precise meaning or reach of a constitutional provision, it should be interpreted and applied in a
manner so as to at least not contradict the text of the Constitution itself. 1
It is necessary to examine how Meese finds these implied principles and how they are reconciled, in difficult cases, with the
text of the Constitution.
C. The Role of the Court in Contemporary
ConstitutionalAdjudication.
Meese's discussion of the express and implied principles of
the Constitution is intended to provide the basis for limiting
the discretion of the Court in reviewing legislative acts. He
acknowledges that constitutional adjudication is not to be a
mechanical process. "It requires an appeal to reason and discretion. The text and intention of the Constitution must be
understood to constitute the banks within which constitutional interpretation must flow." 52 Meese's description of
these constitutional principles should be compared to his discussion of several recent decisions of the Supreme Court.
In his Washington Speech, Meese discussed several recent
decisions of the Court on the meaning of the fourth amendment protection against unreasonable search and seizure. It is
necessary to start as Meese would, with the text of the fourth
amendment:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
51. Id. at 26.
52. Id.
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and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
53
persons or things to be seized.
The text suggests, and the historical record appears to confirm, that a warrant is required before there may be a search
of persons or a seizure of evidence. 4 As long as one does not
deny that the warrant requirement is a fundamental protection "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, '5 5 then its application to states as well as the national government is clear.
Meese in fact does not dispute the application of the fourth
amendment to the states.
Now consider Meese's review of the recent cases in this
area:
Recognizing, perhaps, that the nation is in the throes of a
drug epidemic which has severely increased the burden
borne by law enforcement officers, the Court took a more
progressive stance on the fourth amendment ....
The most prominent among these fourth amendment
cases were: New Jersey v. T.L.O. which upheld warrantless
searches of public school students based on reasonable suspicion that a law or school rule has been violated; this case
also restored a clear local authority over another problem in
our society, school discipline; California v. Carney, which
upheld the warrantless search of a mobile home; United
States v. Sharpe, which approved on-the-spot [i.e., warrantless] detention of a suspect for preliminary questioning and
investigation; United States v. Johns, upholding the warrantless search of sealed packages in a car several days after their
removal by police who possessed probable cause to believe
the vehicle contained contraband; United States v. Hensley,
which permitted a warrantless investigatory stop based on
an unsworn flyer from a neighboring police department; the
flyer stated that reasonable suspicion existed that the detainee was a felon; Hayes v. Florida, which tacitly endorsed
warrantless seizures in the field for the purpose of fingerprinting where reasonable suspicion of criminal activity existed; and United States v. Montoya de Hernandez which
upheld border detentions and warrantless searches by cus-

53. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
54. V THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 16, at 235-38.
55. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
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toms officials based on reasonable suspicion of criminal

activity. 6
Nowhere in this passage is there any indication of a conflict or
tension between the text of the fourth amendment and the
abandonment of the warrant requirement because of exigent
circumstances. Meese is at least required to explain how his
position is faithful to the text and to the original intention of
the Framers. It would appear that Meese's praise of the
Court's "progressive stance" in dealing with the drug epidemic is precisely the kind of result-oriented jurisprudence
and judicial activism that he deplores. His instincts as a law
enforcer appear to have prevailed in this instance over his instincts as a strict contructionist. One should be careful not to
remold the principles to fit the circumstances, as Meese says.
Meese's criticism of the Court in the area of religious liberty is on sounder ground. 7 But there is a mild irony here as
well. The Supreme Court's decisions in this area have been
based ostensibly on a reading of the text and an investigation
of the intentions of the Framers. 8 The problem, to put it
bluntly, is that the Court's historical account is wrong. 9 As
Justice Rehnquist has noted, it is difficult to build sound constitutional doctrine when the underlying constitutional history
is misunderstood. ° It is probably accurate to say that the
Court has been misled in this area by "law office history"
presented by the lawyers. The Court's decisions, which have
become increasingly inconsistent (and incoherent),6 1 give
56. Washington Speech, supra note 4, at 460-61.

57. Id. at 461-64.
58. See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Everson v. Board of Ed., 330

U.S. 1 (1947).
59. See, e.g., W. BERNS, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1976); R. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT FICTION (1982); M. MALBIN, RELIGION AND POLITICS:
THE INTENTIONS OF THE AUTHORS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1978); Van Patten,

In the End is the Beginning: An Inquiry Into the Meaning of the Religion Clauses,27 ST.
Louis U.L.J. 1 (1983).

60. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 92 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
61. Bradley, The Uncertainty PrincipleIn The Supreme Court, 1986 DUKE L.J. 1;
Choper, The Religion Clauses of The First Amendment, 41 U. PITr. L. REV. 673, 67475 (1980); Kurland, The Irrelevance of The Constitution: The Religion Clauses of The
FirstAmendment, 24 VILL. L. REV. 3, 5, 17-27 (1978); Mansfield, The Religion Clause
of the FirstAmendment and the Philosophy of the Constitution, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 847,
848 (1984).
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some caution to any optimism about the ability of the Court
to in fact carry out Meese's jurisprudence of original
intention.
When one considers the articulation and applicability of
the implied general principles, the difficulties become even
more apparent. Consider federalism, which Meese regards as
"one of the most basic principles of our Constitution. ' 62
Meese was quite critical of the recent decision in Garciav. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth.6 3 which overruled National
League of Cities v. Usery 4 and applied the Fair Labor Standards Act to municipal employees. The constitutional issue
was the power of Congress to regulate minimum wages and
maximum hours of state employees. 5
The most detailed discussion in Garcia of the constitutional text and its implicit structure, however, comes from
Justice Blackmun's majority opinion. The constitutional text
expressly gives Congress the power to regulate commerce
among the several states. This, as Blackmun points out, is a
textual limitafion on the sovereignty of the states.6 6 Moreover, the events leading to the Philadelphia Convention and
the debates in the Convention lend support to the recognition
of limitations upon state sovereignty.6 7 The delegates were
concerned about the failure of the Articles of Confederation
government to curb the unrestrained and self-serving behavior
of the state legislatures. 8 Finally, an examination of the
structure of government contemplated by the Framers con62. Washington Speech, supra note 4, at 459.
63. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).

64. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
65. 469 U.S. at 554-56.
66. Id. at 548-54.
67. Id. at 549. See, e.g., F. McDonald, No vus ORDO SECLORUM - THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 268-79 (1985); G. Wood, THE CREATION
OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 403-13 (1969).

68. The principal criticism of the arrangement under the Articles of Confederation
was that the national government was too weak and the state governments were too
strong. MADISON, supra note 14, at 140-48 (the speech of James Madison on June 19).
The ensuing discussion reflected the conviction of the nationalists in the Convention
that the power of the state governments had to be curbed in order to bring the country
out of its then existing crisis. Id. at 151-54. James Madison went so far as to seek a
congressional veto over state legislation. Id. at 79-80, 304-05, 461-62. Although he was
not successful in winning approval of this measure, the Convention did impose certain
prohibitions upon the power of the state legislatures. Id. at 541-42; U.S. CONsT. art. I,

§ 10.
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vinced Blackmun that the restraints on Congress were to be
primarily legislative, not judicial:
In short, the Framers chose to rely on a federal system in
which special restraints on federal power over the States inhered principally in the workings of the National Government itself, rather than in discrete limitations on the objects
of federal authority. State sovereign interests, then, are
more properly protected by procedural safeguards inherent
in the structure of the federal system than by judicially created limitations on federal power.69
There is a counter argument, based upon implied constitutional principles, in Rehnquist's majority opinion in National
League of Cities,7" but little of this argument is based upon an
examination of the original understanding or the historical
record.
Garcia amply illustrates that arguments based upon implied principles can cut both ways. In light of these difficulties, one might expect Meese to have been pleased with the
deference given by the Court to the "democratic process." Instead, he argued that the Court had made "an inaccurate
reading of the text of the Constitution and [had displayed] a
disregard for the Framers' intention that state and local governments be a buffer against the centralizing tendencies of the
national Leviathan."71 The conflict between the principle of
federalism and the respect to be accorded the democratic process in the absence of a clear constitutional limitation is resolved by Meese in favor of the former and against the latter
without an explanation of how the conflict is to be resolved on
a principled basis.
The principle of federalism is clearly more complex than
Meese understands. The Framers did not intend to leave the
states' sovereignty undisturbed, as it existed under the Articles
of Confederation. The states would continue to play an important role in the new regime, but under greater constraints
than had previously existed. The national government was
given affirmative powers which limited the sovereignty of the
states. The power to regulate commerce, the power to coin
money, and the power to organize and call forth the militia
69. MADISON, supra note 14, at 552.

70. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
71. Washington Speech, supra note 4, at 458.
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are examples of such affirmative powers.72 Moreover, the
Constitution placed express prohibitions on certain activities
by the states: they could not coin money, emit bills of credit,
lay duties on imports or exports (without the consent of Congress), 73 nor abridge the privileges and immunities of the citizens from other states. 74 The concept of federalism, therefore,
is not a talisman, nor should it be used as a pious invocation
whenever it suits the purposes of the advocate.
A case in point is New Hampshire v. Piper.7 In Piper, a
woman who passed both the bar exam and the moral character standards of the bar had been denied admission to the bar
solely on the grounds that she was not a resident of New
Hampshire.76 The privileges and immunities clause of the
Constitution prohibits discrimination against persons solely
on account of residency. 77 The Court had long held that the
pursuit of a lawful profession was protected by this clause and
hence it ruled in favor of Ms. Piper in this case.78 This involved a simple application of the text: "The Citizens of each
State shall be entitled to all'79Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States."
Meese, nevertheless, criticized the decision on the grounds
that it violated the principle of federalism. He stated: "With
the apparent policy objective of creating unfettered national
markets for occupations before its eyes, the Court unleashed
article IV against any state preference for residents involving
the professions or service industries." 80 In light of his professed desire that unwritten principles at least not conflict
with the text, Meese surely was required to show how the federalism principle overrode the seemingly clear meaning of the
text in this case. Otherwise, there is the danger of using implied principles to contravene the express words of the text.
He does not attempt to resolve these problems, leaving the
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
470 U.S. 274 (1985).
Id. at 276.
U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 2.
Piper,470 U.S. at 288.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.

80. Washington Speech, supra note 4, at 459.
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impression that his jurisprudence of original intention is as result-oriented as the "noninterpretive review" of those judges
and scholars whom he criticizes.
Meese denies that his call for a jurisprudence of original
intention is result-oriented or has an underlying political
motivation:
A jurisprudence that seeks fidelity to the Constitution - a
jurisprudence of original intention - is not a juris-prudence
of political results. It is very much concerned with process,
and it is a jurisprudence that in our day seeks to depoliticize
the law. The great genius of the constitutional blueprint is
found in its creation and respect for spheres of authority and
the limits it places on governmental power. In this scheme
the Framers did not see the courts as the exclusive custodians of the Constitution. Indeed, because the document
posits so few conclusions it leaves the more political
branches the matter of adapting and vivifying its principles
in each generation. It also leaves to the people of the states,
in the tenth amendment, those responsibilities and rights not
committed to federal care. The power to declare acts of
Congress and laws of the states null and void is truly awesome. This power must be used when the Constitution
clearly speaks. It should not be used when the Constitution
does not.81
It is not clear why this presumption of constitutionality in the
absence of clear textual guidance should be so strong. Meese
himself is willing to abandon the presumption, as his criticism
of the Garcia case illustrates. Moreover, this statement creates yet another unresolved conflict with Meese's own assertion that the Constitution's purpose was to establish limited
government with structures to keep the power of government
in check.82 If limited government is one of the chief purposes,
then why should legislation (or regulations) be entitled to a
presumption of constitutionality? The answer probably lies in
the concept of separation of powers but the problem needs to
be worked through with greater care.
A jurisprudence of original intention is, on its face, probably the most plausible account of how the judiciary should act
within the constitutional framework. Fidelity to the text and
81. London Speech, supra note 7, at 3.
82. Washington Speech, supra note 4, at 457.
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to the underlying intentions of the Framers provide the
strongest grounds for permitting an unelected and largely unaccountable judiciary to overrule the will of legislative majorities. However, the fidelity to text and intention must be
carried out with considerable care. The necessity of this effort, however, is demonstrated when one considers the alternative posed by Justice William Brennan.
III. JUSTICE BRENNAN'S THEORY OF
CONTEMPORARY RATIFICATION

Justice Brennan's speech at Georgetown University was in
itself a remarkable event. Traditionally, the Justices remain
above the political debates which necessarily accompany the
great issues decided by the Court. There was no doubt, however, that Brennan chose this opportunity to respond to
Meese's speeches before the American Bar Association and to
certain political themes advocated by the Reagan Administration. As a result, the speech had much more directness and
candor than is usual with off-the-bench remarks made by sitting Justices.
A.

The ConstitutionalText and the Intentions
of the Framers.
Because the occasion for the Georgetown speech was a
symposium on "Text and Teaching," it was appropriate for
Brennan to discuss the text of the Constitution and his approach to reading and interpreting this document. He began
with a characterization of the text which was markedly different from Meese's:
Our amended Constitution is the lodestar for our aspirations. Like every text worth reading, it is not crystalline.
The phrasing is broad and the limitations of its provisions
are not clearly marked. Its majestic generalities and ennobling pronouncements are both luminous and obscure. This
ambiguity of course8 3calls forth interpretation, the interaction
of reader and text.
Whereas Meese's text is filled with meaningful words and
phrases, carefully chosen by the Framers, Brennan's text contains "majestic generalities and ennobling pronouncements."
83. Georgetown Speech, supra note 2, at 2.
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According to Brennan, this was intended by the Framers. It
is part of the "genius of the Constitution" because the document was not intended to have "any static meaning." '84
Brennan had to be careful he did not give the impression
the text is so vague as to permit the Justices to read their own
values and purposes into the "majestic generalities." He
therefore quickly added that his "encounters" with the text
"are not purely or even primarily introspective ....
"85 Justices of the Supreme Court, he asserted, give the text a "public
reading.

' 86

The act of interpreting "the text must be under-

taken with the sense that it is "the community's interpretation
.... 87 By contrast, the more traditional view was that the
Justices spoke for the Constitution, not the community.
Whatever is meant by the "community's interpretation," it
does not include Meese's jurisprudence of original intention.
Those who argue for interpretation according to the original
intention are wrong, Brennan says:
[I]n truth [this view] is little more than arrogance cloaked as
humility. It is arrogant to pretend that from our vantage we
can gauge accurately the intent of the Framers on application of principle to specific, contemporary questions. All too
often, sources of potential enlightenment such as records of
the ratification debates provide sparse or ambiguous evidence of the original intention. Typically, all that can be
gleaned is that the Framers themselves did not agree about
the application or meaning of particular constitutional provisions, and hid their differences in cloaks of generality. Indeed, it is far from clear whose intention is relevant - that
of the drafters, the congressional disputants, or the ratifiers
in the states? - or even whether the idea of an original intention is a coherent way of thinking about a jointly drafted
document drawing its authority from a general assent of the
states ....One cannot help but speculate that the chorus of
lamentations calling for interpretation faithful to 'original
intention'- and proposing nullification of interpretations
that fail this quick litmus test - must inevitably come from
persons who have no familiarity with the historical record.88
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

7.
3.
14.
4.
4-5.
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It would be reasonable to conclude from this passage that
Brennan completely eschews as arrogant or futile any resort to
the intentions of the Framers. This conclusion, however,
would be wrong. Over the course of nearly thirty years on the
Court, Brennan has on many occasions argued on the basis of
the Framers' intent in a "specific, contemporary" case.
There are many examples; the following are illustrative:
(1) In Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line
Co.,89 the Court held that Congress could not create bankruptcy court judges with article III powers without giving
them the article III protections of life tenure and no salary
diminution during term of office. Brennan's discussion of the
legal framework began with a series of sentences, each one
with the Framers as the subject or the object of the sentence.
Basic to the constitutional structure established by the
Framers was their recognition that "[t]he accumulation of
all powers . .. in the same hands . . . may justly be pro-

nounced the very definition of tyranny." The Federalist
No. 47 ...(J. Madison). To ensure against such tyranny,
the Framers provided that the Federal Government would
consist of three distinct Branches ...... "The Framers regarded the checks and balances ...as a self-executing safeguard ...."
The Federal Judiciary was therefore designed by the
Framers to stand independentofthe Executive and Legislature ....The Court has only recently reaffirmed the signifi-

cance of this feature of the Framers' design ....
90
Not only is the authority of the Framers useful for the resolution of a contemporary constitutional question, there is no
confusion here as to whose intent matters. Brennan cites both
Madison and Hamilton without raising the question of
whether this was a "coherent way of thinking about a jointly
drafted document drawing its authority from a general assent
of the states." 91
(2) Meese may be fairly criticized for treating the Framers
as if they spoke with a single voice, but Brennan does not hesitate to invoke their full authority when he wishes to bestow
importance upon certain constitutional principles and prevent
89. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
90. Id. at 57-58 (citations omitted).
91. See supra text accompanying note 88.
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any "incremental erosion." In Commodity Futures Trading
Comm'n v. Schor,92 a case involving assertion of an executive
agency's jurisdiction over common law counterclaims (a long
established judicial function), Brennan dissented from the majority decision on separation of powers grounds. He stated:
The Framers knew "[t]he accumulation of all powers,
legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands,
whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary,
self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the
very definition of tyranny." In order to prevent such tyranny, the Framers devised a governmental structure composed of three distinct branches - a vigorous legislative
branch, "a separate and wholly independent executive
branch," and "a judicial branch equally independent." The
separation of powers and the checks and balances that the
Framers built into our tripartite form of government were
intended to operate as a "self-executing safeguard against
the encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the
expense of the other." 93
Brennan is able to attribute knowledge, design, and deliberate
construction to the Framers. He is able to speak of them as
joint actors with a single intention which has a particular contemporary application. Apparently, this is one of the atypical
cases where they did agree and did not hide their differences
in "cloaks of generality."
(3) Brennan has been able to discern between Framers as
94
to whose intent counts and when. In Walz v. Tax Comm'n,
the Court upheld a property tax exemption for religious organizations against a challenge on establishment grounds. Brennan wrote a concurring opinion in which he relied on the lack
of objection to tax exemptions for religious organizations by
Thomas Jefferson and James Madison as evidence of their
general acceptance. "It is unlikely that two men so concerned
with the separation of church and state would have remained
'
silent had they thought the exemptions established religion."95
There was some evidence that Madison, later in life, objected
92. 106 S. Ct. 3245 (1986).
93. 106 S. Ct. 3245, 3262 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (cita-

tions omitted).
94. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
95. 397 U.S. 664, 685 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
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to tax exemptions, but Brennan dismissed this as an instance
of extreme views which Madison "may have reached only late
in life."' 96 Brennan noted Madison had expressed no such reservations during the debates in the First Congress and distinguished between Madison's private views and the views of the
Framers: "[E]ven if he privately held these views at that time,
there is no evidence that they were shared by others among
the Framers and Ratifiers of the Bill of Rights." 97
(4) The Framers' actions after the adoption of constitutional provisions can prove useful in ascertaining the core
meaning of those provisions. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 98 the Court reversed a libel judgment and set forth a constitutionally-based standard for lawsuits by public figures.
Brennan's opinion looked to the historical record and found
Jefferson's and Madison's opposition to the Sedition Act of
1798 to be illustrative of the "central meaning" of the free
speech clause. 99 "Although the Sedition Act was never tested
in this Court, the attack upon its validity has carried the day
in the court of history. Fines levied in its prosecution were
repaid by Act of Congress on the ground it was
unconstitutional."100
(5) At other times, the most useful evidence of original
intention is to be found in the ratification debates and other
contemporaneous documents. In Atascadero State Hosp. v.
Scanlon,10 1 Brennan dissented from the majority's holding in
favor of a state's sovereignty immunity claim with an extended analysis of the problem of sovereign immunity from
the state ratification debates. Brennan focused on the Virginia
ratification convention and satisfied himself that Madison's
and Marshall's views on sovereign immunity (not helpful to
his position) were "a minority of those given at the convention." 102 He also asserted that "[t]he debate in the press sheds
further light on the effect of the Constitution on state sover96. Id. at 685 n.5.
97. Id.
98. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
99. Id. at 273.
100. Id. at 276.
101. 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
102. 473 U.S. 234, 269 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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eign immunity." 10 3 From these materials he was able to draw
several conclusions regarding the sovereign immunity doctrine prior to Chisholm v. Georgia11 and the subsequent enactment of the eleventh amendment.10 5 Finally, Brennan
reviewed the debates in Congress concerning the eleventh
amendment and then concluded:
The language of the Eleventh Amendment, its legislative history, and the attendant historical circumstances all strongly
suggest that the Amendment was intended to remedy an interpretation of the Constitution that would have had the
state-citizen and state-alien diversity clauses of Article III
abrogating the state law of sovereign immunity
on state-law
06
causes of actions brought in federal courts.'
Brennan's command of these materials is very skillful and
quite persuasive. He has the inclination and the ability to conduct searching inquiry into the original intentions of the
Framers when it helps buttress his position.
It is fair to conclude from these examples that the historical record for Brennan is not completely hidden in "cloaks of
generality." He is able, on some issues, to "gauge accurately
the intent of the Framers on application of principle to specific, contemporary questions." His inability to discern the intentions of the Framers on other occasions may be influenced
by his desire to reach a decision more in accordance with his
own views. In any event, it is quite interesting to note the
disparity between Brennan's Georgetown Speech, which
scorns the whole idea of original intention, and his own opinions from the bench. The inability of an advocate to live with
his own teaching may be a telling sign.
B. PoliticalMajoritiesand Constitutional Values.
For the most part, it is Brennan's own reading of the constitutional text, not the Framers' intentions, which governs
Brennan's decisions. He is inclined in this reading towards an
active scrutiny of the actions of legislative majorities. He suggests that any presumption against a claim of a constitutional
right, unless there is clear support in the Constitution, cannot
103. Id. at 271.

104. 1 U.S. (2 Dall.) 16 (1793).
105. 473 U.S. at 281 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 289 (emphasis added).
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be politically neutral, as Meese claims. Such a presumption
"expresses antipathy to claims of the minority to rights
against the majority."' 10 7 Although Brennan does not mention
Roe v. Wade 0oby name, he undoubtedly would so describe
this case. It is equally clear that Meese has Roe v. Wade in
mind when he criticizes the Court's judicial activism.10 9 Brennan responded against Meese's majoritarian process argument
by observing: "It is the very purpose of a Constitution - and
particularly of the Bill of Rights - to declare certain values
transcendent, beyond the reach of temporary political
majorities." 110
Brennan has dedicated most of his judicial career to articulating those values which transcend the political process.
For Brennan, the "majestic generalities" of the constitutional
text are not without substance. In fact, he can become quite
literal in his approach to the text. Consider his response to
some of the fourth amendment decisions praised by Meese. 11
In New Jersey v. T.L.Q.,11 2 the Court upheld a search by
school officials, without a warrant, of a student's purse. Brennan, in dissent, said: "Today's decision sanctions school officials to conduct full-scale searches on a 'reasonableness'
standard whose only definite content is that it is not the same
test as the 'probable cause' standard found in the text of the
Fourth Amendment.""1 3 Later, he added: "The Warrant
Clause is something more than an exhortation to this Court to
maximize social welfare as we see fit."' 114 The argument here
is that the majority is molding the text to fit the needs of contemporary society or, at least, of contemporary law enforcement, and Brennan doesn't like it.
Brennan does concede that there is a great deal of risk connected with the inherent ambiguity of the text: "Each generation has the choice to overrule or add to the fundamental
107. Georgetown Speech, supra note 2, at 5.
108. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
109. London Speech, supra note 7, at 11.
110. Georgetown Speech, supra note 2, at 6.
111. Brennan voted to overturn the conviction of all but one of the decisions cited
by Meese.
112. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
113. 469 U.S. 325, 354 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
114. Id. at 356 (emphasis in original).
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principles enunciated by the Framers; the Constitution can be
amended or it can be ignored. Yet with respect to its fundamental principles, the text has suffered neither fate.' 15 This is
Brennan's notion of "contemporary ratification." By the
"public reading" of the constitutional text, each generation
participates in the ratifying of the evolving Constitution. It is
not clear how "each generation" actually participates, unless
it is through the justices as representatives of each generation.
Nor is it clear how the Constitution can have "transcendent
values" when the meaning of the Constitution must be ratified
by each successive generation.
At Georgetown, Brennan spoke eloquently about the
evolving text and the need to read the Constitution as "Twen'
tieth Century Americans." 116

But the ultimate question must be, what do the words of the
text mean in our time? For the genius of the Constitution
rests not in any static meaning it might have had in a world
that is dead and gone, but in the adaptability of its great
principles to cope with current problems and current needs.

What the constitutional fundamentals meant to the wisdom
of other7 times cannot be their measure to the vision of our
time.' 1

This is the extent of Brennan's praise for an age that is "dead
and gone." But listen to Brennan's words in another of the
fourth amendment cases praised by Meese. Here he chastises
the majority's decision to approve a warrantless search at the
United States border: "[T]he Court repeatedly has emphasized that the Fourth Amendment's Warrant Clause is not
mere 'dead language' or a bothersome 'inconvenience to be
somehow "weighed" against the claims of police efficiency.' "118 Brennan certainly doesn't think the warrant requirement is "dead and gone," nor does he believe it is
adaptable to "cope with current problems and current needs."
Brennan has shown extreme displeasure concerning other
Justices' attempts at contemporary ratification of an evolving
constitutional provision in the face of changing societal condi115. Georgetown Speech, supra note 2, at 7.
116. Id. at 7.

117. Id.
118. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 552 (1985) (Brennan,

J., dissenting).

1987]

PARTISAN BATTLE OVER THE CONSTITUTION

417

tions. In United States v. Leon, 119 Brennan dissented in part
as follows:
The majority ignores the fundamental constitutional importance of what is at stake here. While the machinery of
law enforcement and indeed the nature of crime itself have
changed dramaticallysince the Fourth Amendment became
part of the Nation'sfundamentallaw in 1791, what the Framers understood then remains true today - that the task of
combating crime and convicting the guilty will in every era
seem of such critical and pressing concern that we may be
lured by the temptations of expediency into forsaking our
commitment to protecting individual liberty and privacy. It
was for that very reason that the Framers of the Bill of
Rights insisted that law enforcement efforts be permanently
and unambiguously restricted in order to preserve personal
freedoms .... If those independent tribunals lose their resolve, however, as the Court has done today, and give way to
the seductive call of expediency, the vital guarantees of the
Fourth Amendment
are reduced to nothing more than a
"form of words.' 120
The adaptability of the Constitution's "great principles to
cope with current problems and current needs" apparently
has some limits. Brennan's belief that the Framers insisted on
permanent restrictions on law enforcement efforts would appear to give the fourth amendment a "static meaning."
Brennan's concern with the Court's direction sometimes
makes him sound a lot like Edwin Meese. In NationalLeague
of Cities v. Usery,121 the Court invalidated the amendment of
the Fair Labor Standards Act as an unconstitutional interference with state sovereignty and Brennan spoke sharply in
dissent:
I cannot recall another instance in the Court's history when
the reasoning of so many decisions covering so long a span
of time has been discarded in such a roughshod manner.
That this is done without any justification not already often
advanced and consistently rejected clearly renders today's
decision an ipse dixit reflecting nothing but displeasure with
a congressional judgment .... More alarming is the startling restructuring of our federal system, and the role they
119. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
120. 468 U.S. 897, 929-30 (1984) (Brennan, J.,dissenting) (emphasis added).
121. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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create therein for the federal judiciary. This Court is simply
not at liberty to erect a mirror of its own conception of a
desirable governmental structure .

. .

. It is unacceptable

that the judicial process should be thought superior to the
political process in this area. 122
One would think this was Meese talking about Roe v. Wade.
What does he expect with a "living Constitution?" It sometimes grows in directions that some, or many, do not like.
When the process of constitutional adjudication becomes a
common law process - where judges articulate and shape the
doctrines as they go along - problems like Brennan describes
in NationalLeague of Cities will arise. If the text is inherently
ambiguous and the historical record offers little guidance,
then constitutional interpretation must inevitably become introspective. Ultimately, a community of shared interpretation
(or, in Brennan's words, "the public reading") becomes difficult, if not impossible, to sustain.
The contrast between Brennan's Georgetown Speech and
his statements on the bench is striking. He does not hesitate
to argue from the literal words of the text and the intentions
of the Framers when they lend support to his views on a particular issue. It should be apparent, however, that these arguments are means to an end and that this end is not to be found
either in the text or the intentions of the Framers. Brennan's
"lodestar" is not the Constitution itself, but instead what he
calls "the constitutional vision of human dignity."' 123 This
"lodestar" is clearly of modem origin. It cannot be found in
the preamble to the Constitution, where the purposes are outlined, nor in the body of the Constitution (even as amended),
nor in any contemporaneous document from this period.
A substantial portion of the Georgetown Speech is devoted
to discussing the "fruits" of his discourse in Court decisions,
"on the dignity of man."' 24 He attributes this vision to the
constitutional text, as augmented by the Bill of Rights and the
Civil War Amendments, but it is fair to say that other "readers" on the Court have not been able to see the same "visions"
in the text. Nor will future generations necessarily see the
122. 426 U.S. 833, 871-72, 875, 876 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
123. Georgetown Speech, supra note 2, at 11.
124. Id. at 8.
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same visions. "[W]hat those fundamentals mean for us, our
descendants will learn, cannot be their measure to the vision
125
of their time."
Brennan admits that on the death penalty issue, his vision
of human dignity is not shared by a majority of the Court or
the American public.126 But he is willing to persist in voting
against the death penalty, notwithstanding the principle of
stare decisis.
[I]n my judgment, when a Justice perceives an interpretation
of the text to have departed so far from its essential meaning,
that Justice is bound, by a larger constitutional duty to the
community, to expose the departure and point toward a different path. On this issue, the death penalty, I hope to embody a community striving for127human dignity for all,
although perhaps not yet arrived.
It is clear that on this issue, Brennan does not strive for the
community's interpretation of the text. Rather, he is attempting to lead the community to accept his vision of the text's
"essential meaning." This is extraordinarily difficult because
the text itself clearly contemplates the possibility of the death
penalty. The fifth and fourteenth amendments address, inter
alia, with procedural protections to be accorded in capital
cases. Thus, he has to extract the "essential meaning" from a
text which is directly contrary to his own reading. In this instance, Brennan has chosen not to speak for the Constitution
(the traditional duty of the judge) or the community (the view
he suggested at the beginning of his speech), but instead for
himself.
Brennan has utilized this technique before in the area of
religious liberty. When a close examination of the history behind the adoption of the first amendment showed governmental encouragement and support of religious institutions,
Brennan warned against a "too literal quest for the advice of
the Founding Fathers." He urged that the historical inquiry
should be limited to the understanding of "broad purposes,
not specific practices."' 128 When the historical record suggests
a result contrary to the one Brennan wished to reach, he ex125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 7.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 13-14.
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 237 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
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tracts from that record "broad purposes" which supply the
"essential meaning" even though the evidence is to the
contrary.
Brennan's vision of the text is either clear or blurred, depending upon the issues in the case; the historical record becomes obscure or immutable, depending upon the issues in the
case. Ultimately, his vision of human dignity is not to be limited by the text, countervailing practices of the Framers, or by
underlying purposes which conflict with his vision. One may
conclude that his vision, therefore, is essentially introspective
and that his method of constitutional interpretation is
idiosyncratic.
Brennan's reading, though idiosyncratic, is not without
political consequences. Brennan's judicial activism increases
the role of government in the life of every individual. The
multiplication of rights increases the number of conflicts between government and individuals and between competing
versions of rights among individuals. The power to resolve
these conflicts usually vests in the judicial branch of government. Brennan welcomes, and Meese deplores, this redistribution of power to the judiciary. Brennan's view of
constitutional interpretation inures to his own political benefit
because it places policy decisions in a favorable forum and insulates the outcomes from the political pressures of representative democracy. "Contemporary ratification" is ultimately
not a ratification by the people. It is a concept advanced by a
judicial activist which has the purpose of concealing in
"cloaks of generality" the exercise of power over others.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Neither Attorney General Meese nor Justice Brennan
have given us a satisfactory account of constitutional interpretation. Both approaches break down upon closer examination, albeit for different reasons. A summary of these
difficulties may point the way to a more principled approach
to constitutional interpretation.
Meese's central argument is that the Constitution has an
objective content which is ascertainable apart from partisan
debate. This content can be determined from the text and the
intentions of the Framers manifested in the debates and contemporary historical records. Meese clearly bears the burden
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of proof on this argument and it would appear that, thus far,
he has failed to carry this burden. The discerning of meaning
from the text and intentions of the Framers must be demonstrated with more care than Meese has yet mustered. A jurisprudence of original intention, furthermore, does not aid
adjudication where the historical record is in fact inconclusive. Finally, Meese's comments on original intention and
constitutional adjudication unwittingly reveal that he does not
understand the difficulties of ascertaining the Framers' intentions or of resolving conflicts between various constitutional
principles.
The less charitable conclusion is that Meese's account of
the Framers' intentions is done with an eye towards contemporary political issues and is itself motivated by partisan concerns. His emphasis on the text is intended to counter the
recent recognition by the Court of implied rights, particularly
in the area of privacy. His call for deference to the legislative
process is intended to counter judicial activism generally. His
criticism of Garcia,however, favors state sovereignty over deference to the legislative process. His praise of the "progressive stance" of the Court in the search and seizure area is
consistent with a type of judicial activism he favors. If there is
to be a case for jurisprudence of original intention, it will
probably have to be made by one who is less intimately involved with partisan politics.
Brennan proves to be no less a partisan than Meese. It is
apparent that his "public reading" of the text is influenced by
his own political views. Brennan, of course, would deny he is
acting as a "Platonic Guardian," but he offers no real argument against the charge and his actions on the bench prove
otherwise. His defense ultimately rests upon cliches which are
transparent and contradictory. How can there be a "public
reading" of the Constitution consistent with "transcendent
values?" How can there be "transcendent values" when the
meaning of the text must be determined and ratified by each
generation in response to contemporary circumstances? How
can there be "permanent and unambiguous" restrictions on
law enforcement from a text which consists largely of "majestic generalities?"
As in most debates, some interesting ironies arise. There is
the irony of Meese's praise of the new "progressive" approach
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in search and seizure cases and Brennan's corresponding insistence upon a strict and permanent construction of the warrant
requirement. Brennan's arguments against original intention
and in favor of an evolving interpretation are undermined significantly by his own actions on the bench. Both men describe
a constitution which is relatively easy to interpret, but there is
little in common between their respective visions of the Constitution. A less ironic but more disturbing aspect of this debate is that there is so little agreement between these two
public figures on a matter which is fundamental to constitutional government.
It is also apparent, however, that we are not confronted
with these two alternatives only. The problems of partisan interpretation can be minimized if the inquiry into the intentions of the Framers is honest and fair-minded. Where the
historical record provides guidance, we should take heed.
Where it is ambiguous, we should analyze in light of the principles we do know toward a solution which is consistent with
these principles. The "genius of the Constitution" does not lie
chiefly in its adaptability, but in its ability to give the fairminded observer principled guidance in the resolution of contemporary constitutional problems.

